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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners, LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. and
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION (collectively referred to as
"Private Ledger") petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to
review the Memorandum Decision (not for official publication) of
the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Brcroch v. Harry.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether or not a principal may be held liable for the
unauthorized acts of an agent on the basis of apparent authority
where the agent has acted so far out of the scope of the
authority granted to him that he has been criminally convicted of
defrauding his principal in that specific transaction.
Whether or not a principal may be held liable for the
unauthorized acts of an agent where the plaintiffs have produced
no credible admissible evidence of reasonable reliance that the
agent had the apparent authority to conduct the unauthorized act.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
Private Ledger seeks review of the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals in Brcroch v. Harry, supra [see Appendix, Exhibit
"A" . ]
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals Opinion was filed on April 18, 1996.
Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing was denied on June 18,
1996.

[See Appendix, Exhibit "B"]

On July 18, 1996 this Court

issued an order extending time to file this Writ of Certiorari to
and including August 19, 1996.

[See Appendix, Exhibit "C"]
1

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Private Ledger seeks review of the Court of

Appeals Opinion on the following basis:

The decision has so far

departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Utah Supreme
Court's power of supervision; the Opinion if allowed to stand
will establish a disastrous precedent; and the Court of Appeals
has decided a critical question of state law which has not been,
should be, settled by the State's highest court.

Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure 46(a)(3), 46(a)(4) (1994).
STATUTES AND RULES
Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure set
forth the considerations governing the review of this Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the unauthorized (and criminal) acts of
an agent which were so far outside the course and scope of the
authority granted to him by the principal that the trial court
properly determined, as a matter of law, that the principal was
not responsible for the acts of the agent.
Exhibit uDfl]

[See Appendix,

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the

trial court and in so doing, set up an erroneous course in clear
conflict with federal law and the laws of other jurisdictions,
and in degradation of sound public policy.
///
///
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The claims of plaintiffs Frank Brgoch ("Brgoch") and

Seymour Isaacs ("Isaacs") all arise from an investment each made
in May 1988 in Red River, an Arizona real estate limited
partnership.

Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were made by

Defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry"), to whom each plaintiff
had granted a discretionary power of attorney to make such
investments.
2.

[R. 463-465]

Defendant Harry acted as stock broker for plaintiffs

Isaacs and Brgoch at various brokerage firms from 1977 through
1989. [R. 493-498, 499-504]

Brgoch and Isaacs were experienced

investors, who began speculating in the stock market in 1972 and
who had at least one other broker who they regularly used for
speculative investments.

[R. 636-640]

For example, Brgoch

invested approximately $40,000 in speculative penny stocks over a
ten year period.
3.

[R. 636-640]

Following their respective retirements as airline

pilots in 1984, Brgoch and Isaacs contend that they specifically
and continually instructed Harry (years before he had any
affiliation with Private Ledger) that they wanted no more limited
partnership investments, no investments which were subject to
continuing contributions, and no long term investments inasmuch
as they were both living off their retirement accounts and long
term investments were of no use to them given their life
expectancy.

[R. 493-504]

///
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4.

Harry became a licensed independent contractor

registered representative of Private Ledger in late December of
1987, and executed his Registered Representative Agreement on
January 11, 1988.

[R. 523-530]

Before joining Private Ledger,

Harry was with Prudential Bache Securities in Salt Lake City,
Utah, where both plaintiffs were his clients.

In fact, Harry

joined Private Ledger shortly after his former colleague at
Prudential Bache, Cregg Cannon ("Cannon"), became a licensed
independent contractor Registered Representative of Private
Ledger on November 25, 1987.
5.

[R. 564-566, 519]

On or about May 9, 1988, Harry caused $30,600 of

Brgoch's funds and $31,000 of Isaacs' funds to be invested in Red
River.

[R. 461-465]

At the time of those investments, Harry had

been plaintiffs' stock broker for over ten years, but he had been
affiliated with Private Ledger for less than five months.
Plaintiffs' long term relationship was with Harry, not Private
Ledger.

See State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Utah App.

1994) .
6.

To facilitate the later making of these Red River

investments, Harry had caused to be transferred by wire transfer
the necessary funds from plaintiffs' respective accounts at
Private Ledger to the First National Bank of Onaga, Kansas.
[R. 463-465]

Both plaintiffs admit that their Private Ledger

statements in May or June of 1988 showed the transfer of funds
from their accounts to the Kansas bank in accounts in their name.
[R. 600 (H 3 ) , 605 (H 3)]

No mention was ever made of Red River
4

on Private Ledger's records and the transfer of plaintiffs' funds
to bank accounts in their name in Kansas was entirely proper.
[R. 567-568]

It was after the plaintiffs' funds were in their

individual accounts in the Kansas bank that the Red River
investments were made.

[R. 463-465, 600, 605]

Private Ledger

had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the Red River
investments, and plaintiffs have never contended otherwise.
7.

Brgoch and Isaacs contend that Harry did not seek or

obtain their prior approval to make the investments in Red River
and that the investments in Red River were, in fact, contrary to
their prior specific instructions to Harry concerning the types
of investments they wanted to make following their retirements.
[R. 436, 441-446, 449-455, 493-504]

They do not contend that

Private Ledger had any knowledge of the Red River investments
prior to or at the time those investments were made.
8.

In or about July 1988, approximately two months after

the Red River investments were made, Brgoch and Isaacs each
received a statement dated June 30, 1988 from the First National
Bank of Onaga stating funds that had been transferred to the
First National Bank of Onaga and that these funds had then been
used to purchase units in Red River.
465] .

[R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-

The Kansas bank statements expressly informed plaintiffs

that their funds had been invested in a limited partnership.
[R. 463-465]

Both Brgoch and Isaacs admit receiving and

reviewing their statement from the Kansas bank in July 1988.
[R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-465, 600 (f 4 ) , 605 {% 4)]
5

9.

Following receipt of the June 30, 1988 statement from

First National Bank of Onaga, Brgoch and Isaacs went to see Harry
in July 1988 to discuss the meaning of the statement and the
investment in Red River.
10.

[R. 600, 605]

At the meeting and afterwards, neither Brgoch nor

Isaacs made any effort to investigate the details of their new
investment.

[R. 444, 447]

Plaintiffs dealt with Harry, and

failed to produce any evidence that either of them had ever made
any attempt to contact anyone at Private Ledger.

Plaintiffs'

failure to make any attempt to contact or complain to anyone at
Private Ledger after learning of Harry's conduct in July 1988
further confirms their awareness that Private Ledger had no
involvement whatsoever with Red River and Harry's activities
involving Red River.
11.

Private Ledger first learned of Cannon's involvement

with Red River when Private Ledger received a letter from Scott
R. Frost of the State of Utah, Department of Business
Regulations, Securities Division, dated February 3, 1989.
511, 567]

[R.

Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly investigated the

matter and terminated its relationship with Cannon on March 8,
1989.

[R. 512-513, 567-568]

Private Ledger was subsequently

informed that Red River was an Arizona limited partnership and
that the general partners were Cannon and Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr.
[R. 567]
12.

Private Ledger did not become of aware of Harry's

involvement with Red River until November 7, 1989.
6

[R. 568]

Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly terminated its relationship
with Harry on November 15, 1989.
13.
Ledger.

[R. 568]

Red River was never approved for sale by Private
[R. 567]

Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were not

made through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never
appeared on any Private Ledger statements.

[R. 567-568]

Private

Ledger received no commissions or fees on the Red River
transactions.

[R. 568]

Private Ledger had no prior knowledge

that Harry had solicited plaintiffs to invest in Red River.
[R. 568]
14.

At the time Harry became a licensed independent

contract Registered Representative of Private Ledger, he signed a
written agreement [R. 523, 564-565], which specifically provided
that he would only sell securities which had been approved by
Private Ledger for sale.

[R. 525 (H 3A), 564-565]

In addition,

Harry signed a separate memorandum acknowledging Private Ledger's
strict prohibition [and the prohibition by the National
Association of Security Dealers ("NASD")] against the
solicitation and sale of private securities transactions which
were not approved by Private Ledger, referred to in the
securities industry as "selling away".

[R. 566-567, 508-510]

Cannon had also executed a similar document.

[R. 567-568, 505-

507]
15.

Following their termination by Private Ledger, Cannon

pled guilty and Harry was later convicted following trial of four
counts, including committing criminal fraud on Private Ledger in
7

connection with his unauthorized solicitation and sale of
investments in Red River.

[R. 569]

affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
16.

Harry's conviction was
[State v. Harry, supra]

Brgoch and Isaacs filed their original Complaint on

March 17, 1992 naming Harry and Private Ledger as defendants.
[R. 2-8]

Plaintiffs' claims all arise solely from their

investment in Red River.

Despite claims that the Red River

investments were unauthorized and based on mistake, plaintiffs
never sued Red River or either of its general partners, or the
Bank of Onaga.
17.

[R. 2-8, 288-302]

On December 31, 1992, plaintiffs filed a First Amended

Complaint alleging seven causes of action.

[R. 288-302]

Private

Ledger was named as a defendant in only the Second Cause of
Action for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Fourth Cause of
Action for alleged negligence, the Sixth Cause of action for
alleged violations under the Utah Uniform Securities' Act.
18.

On March 30, 1994, Private Ledger moved for Summary

Judgment [R. 405-407] on two grounds:

(1) Private Ledger was not

liable for Harry's actions because Harry acted outside the
control and scope of authority granted to him by Private Ledger
for the sale of approved securities; and (2) plaintiffs' claims
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because
plaintiffs were admittedly aware in July of 1988, more than three
years before they filed this action, that Harry violated their
express agreement regarding investments.

On May 17, 1994, the

trial court granted Private Ledger's motion on the first ground
8

only, but denied it as to the second ground.

[R. 666, 820-822]

On April 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed [Appendix,
Exhibit " A " ] . Private Ledger moved for rehearing and the Court
of Appeals ordered plaintiffs to file a response, and then denied
the petition for rehearing.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Of Appeals Decision Is Bad Law And Violative Of
Sound Public Policy,
The issue which Petitioner seeks review is of vital

importance to every employer and principal in the State of Utah.
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, in reversing the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Private Ledger,
emphasizes the "general rule that a principal is liable for
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during
existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's
actual or apparent authority" [see Appendix, Exhibit "A", p.l
(emphasis added)] citing Restatement (Second) of Agency section
161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus., Inc., 626
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981).

While this general rule of law may

be correct, it is only the starting point in the analysis of a
principal's liability for the unauthorized acts of its agent
under the theory of apparent authority.

The Court of Appeals

Memorandum Decision, however, ends its analysis at this starting
point.
Although there are no Utah cases directly on point involving
securities broker-dealers and "selling away," it is well settled
9

that for a principal to be vicariously liable for the
unauthorized acts of its agents under a theory of apparent
authority, the principal must conduct itself in such a way as to
clothe its agent with the apparent authority to perform the torts
committed and there must be reasonable reliance on that apparent
authority on the part of the injured party.

Jackson v. Righter,

891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995) (affirming grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants); see also Luddington v.
Bodenvest, Ltd., 855 P.2d 204-209 (Utah 1993); State ex rel. Div.
of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah
1988).

Without conduct on the part of the principal and

reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, a claim based
upon apparent authority cannot be maintained.
at 13 91 (emphasis added).

Jackson, supra,

The Court of Appeals Memorandum

Decision fails to address these key requirements, stating only
that question of fact exists over the scope of the agent's
authority [Appendix, Exhibit "A", p.2] despite a fully developed
record at the trial court level of the absence of any proof of
these requirements.
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision also fails to
adhere to Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
cases construing that rule.

Private Ledger's summary judgment

motion was made and supported with abundant admissible evidence
that Harry was not the actual or ostensible agent of Private
Ledger in connection with his activities with plaintiffs
involving Red River.

Having made that showing, Rule 56(e) then
10

shifted the burden to plaintiffs to prove by admissible evidence
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (e); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah,
Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994); Harline v. Barker, et al., 912
P.2d 433 1996 Utah LEXIS 11 (Utah 1996).

Plaintiffs produced no

such admissible evidence.
Where an agent's conduct is clearly outside the scope of his
authority, the issue may be decided as a matter of law.

Jackson,

supra, at 1390; Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057
(Utah 1989).

That is precisely what the trial court did in

granting summary judgment in favor of Private Ledger.
Under the standard articulated by the Court of Appeals, in
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, it will be
virtually impossible for any employer to ever obtain summary
judgment despite completely uncontradicted facts and evidence
that the principal did not clothe the agent with apparent
authority and that there was no reasonable reliance of apparent
authority on the part of the plaintiff.
B.

The Court Of Appeals Misconstrued Horrocks.
As noted above, in its Memorandum Decision, the Court of

Appeals cites Horrocks for the general rule that "a principal is
liable for the injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent,
committed during the existence of the agency and within the scope
of the agent's actual or apparent authority."
8 92 P.2d at 14-15.

Horrocks, supra,

However, the Court of Appeals misconstrued

Horrocks.
11

In discussing apparent authority, the Horrocks court noted
"the record is replete with facts sufficient to clothe Buchanan
[the agent] with such apparent authority."

Id. at 16.

In

stating that it was reasonable for Horrocks to believe that
Buchanan was the agent of Westfalia [the principal], the court
noted that Buchanan had used the principal's documentation to
obtain the plaintiff's funds, the principal had cashed the
plaintiffs' check and the principal had provided a form which the
agent used to deceive the plaintiff.

Id.

Thus, Horrocks

expressly recognizes that for apparent authority to exist, (1)
the principal must clothe the agent with apparent authority and
(2) there must be reasonable reliance on the part of the
plaintiff.
The uncontroverted evidence is that neither of these
elements was present in this case.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals

misconstrued the holding in Horrocks and this Court should grant
certiorari in order to clarify this inconsistency.
C.

The Court Of Appeals Decision Is Contrary To The Clearly
Established Law Of Other Jurisdictions,
Substantial case law from other jurisdictions supports

Private Ledger's position that, as a matter of law, a securities
broker-dealer may not be held liable for the unauthorized
activities or "selling away" activities of their registered
representatives.

The most recent decision is Bates v. Shearson

Lehman Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79-82 (1st Cir. 1994), and concluded,
as a matter of law, that a securities broker-dealer had no
liability to one of its customers who had been defrauded by the
12

clearly unauthorized activity of its registered representatives.
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision here, albeit an
unpublished one, is the only authority to the contrary, and does
not even distinguish or discuss the clearly established law of
other jurisdictions cited in Private Ledger's Appellate Brief.
Of particular significance is Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d
1338 (9th Cir. 1994) where the Ninth Circuit held, as a matter of
law, that a securities broker-dealer was not liable for the
"selling away activities" of its registered representatives,
including a rejection of any alleged liability for ostensible
agency.

In affirming summary judgment, the Hauser court

concluded:
Nevertheless, the District Court correctly
concluded the record left no room for genuine
issue of fact, because it established that
the customers could not have believed that
Rausher/Pierce [the broker-dealer] had
anything to do with the NTE promotion [the
subject investment]. Id. at 1343.
The Mississippi Supreme Court reached a similar decision in
FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2nd 979 (Miss. 1994) .
In FSC Securities, the court noted:
Federal and state courts and other
jurisdictions have been reluctant to find
broker-dealers vicariously liable for the
underhanded dealings of registered
representatives in circumstances similar to
the case sub justice. These cases have
turned on the doctrine of apparent authority.
Apparent authority is to be determined from
the acts of the principal and requires
reliance and good faith on the part of the
third party.
[Citation] ... The first
element of apparent authority is whether the
principal knowingly and/or negligently
permitted their agents to claim they were
13

acting within the scope of their authority.
This element involves the conduct of the
principal rather than that of the plaintiff.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added in).
In rejecting a claim of apparent authority by plaintiffs,
the FSC Securities court considered a record which is nearly
identical to the trial court record here, and stated:
The McCormacks [plaintiffs] had no contact
with FSC [the broker-dealer], made no effort
to follow their investment through FSC and
relied on and dealt only with Manuel [the
registered representative] ...
•

*

*

The record clearly indicates that Manuel as
well as FSC Securities' other registered
representatives act within the scope of
employment only when soliciting or
transacting business in securities approved
for sale by the broker-dealer. Id. at 18-19.
This case is completely distinguishable from Horrocks. which
involved the principal's active involvement, receipt of funds,
and the knowledge and use of the principal's forms, but is
indistinguishable from Hauser, Bates, FSC Securities and other
cases cited by Private Ledger on this issue.

Indeed, the Court

of Appeals Memorandum Decision contradicts its own prior analysis
of Private Ledger's strict rules and procedures and the
prohibited practice of "selling away," as set forth in State v.
Harry, supra, 873 P.2d at 1152.
The Court of Appeals Decision is clearly unwise precedent
and a dramatic departure from the sound jurisprudence of other
jurisdictions.

This Court should grant certiorari to correct

this conflict.

This is not a case of conflicting authorities on
14

this issue.

There is no reported decision consistent with the

Court of Appeals Decision here.
D.

The Court Of Appeals Misconstrued The Trial Court's Ruling,
The Court of Appeals takes issue with the trial court's

comment that "one cannot be an agent of the principal while at
the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent
as to Private Ledger" and states that no authority exists for
this proposition.

[See Appendix, Exhibit "A", p. 1]

This

comment, however, is entirely consistent with the trial court's
finding that no evidence existed that Private Ledger in any way
clothed Harry with the apparent authority to sell the Red River
partnerships and that Harry's actions were so far outside the
course of his agency that any purported reliance by plaintiffs
was unreasonable.
Here, unlike many cases involving criminal activity of an
agent, the purported agent was criminally convicted not only of
defrauding the customers, but criminally convicted of defrauding
Private Ledger as well.

State v. Harry, supra.

As noted in

Private Ledger's Appellate Brief, if Private Ledger had any
knowledge or culpability whatsoever, or had in any way ratified
or condoned such activities by Harry, that knowledge,
ratification or conduct would have presented a defense to Harry
in the criminal case, where he was convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt of having defrauded Private Ledger.
///
///
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Private Ledger respectfully
requests that this Court grant its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

DATED:

August 16, 19 96

Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT

r
By:
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LLP

CERTIFICATION OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify on this 19th day of August, 1996, true and
correct copies of the foregoing document were hand delivered to:
J. Michael Coombs
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Randy B. Coke
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
3 33 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
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APPENDIX

Exhibit "A"
Brgoch v. Harry
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision

FILED
APR 1 8 1996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

F r a n k Brgoch a n d Seymour
Isaacs,
Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not F o r O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n )

and A p p e l l a n t s ,
C a s e No.

Ronald A l l e n H a r r y , an
i n d i v i d u a l ; P r i v a t e Ledger
Financial Services, I n c . ;
Linsco F i n a n c i a l S e r v i c e s ,
I n c . ; L i n s c o / P r i v a t e Ledger
C o r p o r a t i o n ; a n d Does 1 t o 1 0 ,

950238-CA

F t L E D
( A p r i l 1 8 , 1996)

Defendants and A p p e l l e e s .

Third District, Salt Lake County
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Attorneys:
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S. Baird Morgan, Salt Lake City, Michael L. Kirby and
Jeffrey P. Lendrum, San Diego, California, for
Appellees
J. Michael Coombs, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Ronald Harry

Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins.
ORME, Presiding Judge:
The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion,
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor
have defendants called our attention to any such authority.
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent* s
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14, 15-16
(Utah App. 1995); Pouisen v. Treasure State Indus.. Inc., S26

P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the
clearest cases. Carcrill. Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kisslincr, 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash.
App. 1989). Simply because the agent commits an act that is
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party.
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants
and the scope of Harry's authority.
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otherwise
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Lanaford, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1996). See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App.
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and
after the transaction" in question).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be
appropriate.

Gregory E^Orme,
Presidifig Judge

Z

WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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Braoch v. Harry
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JUN 1 8 199B
±N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo

Marilyn to. Bran h

C/erk of the Court

RECEIVED

Frank Brgoch and Seymour
Isaacs,

ORDER

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

JUN 2

1

Case No. 950238-®A' **** VUONAN*SWEAT

v,
Ronald Allen Harry, an
individual, Private Ledger
Financial Services, Inc.,
Linsco Financial Services,
Inc., Linsco\Private Ledger
corporation, and Does 1 to 10,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court upon appellees' petition for
rehearing, filed May 16, 1996.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.
Dated this

10*3day

FOR THE COURT:

inr\flA*y / b . fr\^L
Marilyn M. Brancn
Clerk of the Court

of J u n e , 1996

1996
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CLERK SUPREME COURT,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
yfou
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR
ISAACS,
Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Case No.
vs.

RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an
individual. PRIVATE LEDGER
FINANCIAL SERVICES. INC.,
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES.
INC.; LINSCO/PRTVATE LEDGER
CORPORATION and DOES 1 to 1C.
Defendants/Appellees,

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME

Randy B. Coke
Curtis C. Nesset
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
(801) 328-2506

S. Baird Morgan
STRONG & HANNI
#9 Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 532-7080

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Michael L. Kirby
Jeffrey P. Lendrum
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT LLP
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101 3302
(619) 231-8666
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
(Except for Ronald Allen Harry)

RCV B v :POS" O B " et. a .

7-13-36 • '5:37

201 323 2090^

lltn FtOOR OSui# 3

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME
Based on the Motion of Defencant-Petitioner, Linsco Private Ledger Corporation,
and for good cause showing, it is hereby ordered:
The requested extension of time is hereby granted. Defendant-Petitioner shall have
1

through and including August 19, 1996. in which to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
pursuant to Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this / £ _ day of July, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

2l266fcLedSer
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE..JDF..UTAH.

3
4

*

* * * * *

FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR
ISAACS,

5
Plaintiffs,
6
CASE NO. 920901463 CV

VS.
7
8
9
10
11
12

RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC . ;
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES,
SERVICES, INC., LINSCO/
/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION,
and DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants.
* * * * *

13
14

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI

15
16

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

17

(Bench Ruling)

18
19

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

20
21

May 17, 1994

22
23
24
25

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1
2

A P P E A R A N C E S
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

3

RANDY B. COKE

4

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

5

333 North 300 West Street

6

Salt Lake City, Utah

7

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

8

S. BAIRD MORGAN

9

STRONG & HANNI

10

9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor

11
12

84103

Salt Lake City, UT

84111

and

13

MICHAEL L. KIRBY

14

POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT

15

701 "B" Street, Suite 1400

16

San Diego, CA

17

92101

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT HARRY:

18

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS

19

72 East 400 South, Suite 220

20

Salt Lake City, UT

84111

21
22
23
24
25

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH? MAY 17, 1994; A.M. SESSION

2

(REPORTER'S NOTE:

3

The following is an

excerpt of proceedings in the above-entitled case:)

4

THE COURT:

Thank youf Mr. Kirby.

5

Dealing with the statute of limitations first, I

6

think that Mr. Coke has presented an issue of fact

7

regarding the concealment issue by Mr. Harry and I think

8

that remains to be an issue of fact in any mind.

9

More critically, though, is my analysis as to the

10

matter of law as to whether or not Private Ledger should

11

be held liable•

12

states to me the general proposition regarding respondeat

13

superior, no controlling person.

14

I have no argument with Mr. Coke when he

The question I have is just how far can that be

15

reached when the defendant in this matter, Private Ledger,

16

has gone to what I think is more than sufficient steps to

17

ensure that activities by their registered agent are

18

pursuant to their policies.

19

It is apparent that Red River was not an approved

20

security from Private Ledger, that there was no

21

authorization from Private Ledger to Mr. Harry to go

22

beyond that policy.

23

registered representative of a brokerage firm clearly

24

violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized

25

activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this

In essencef it appears that when a

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

3

1

matter, I just cannot see how liability can be imposed

2

upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter.

3

It did not appear on Private Ledger statements

4

regarding the purchase of this.

5

indication that money was transferred but that was all

6

that was done and that knowledge was to the plaintiffs in

7

this matter.

8'
9

There may have been

Private Ledger, once again, never approved of the
Red River investment.

It did not appear — a s I said the

10

plaintiffs' investments were not run through the Private

11

Ledger accounts to the extent of appearing on Private

12

Ledger statements.

13

and no prior knowledge of Private Ledger of the activity

14

of Mr. Harry.

15

There had been no fees, no collections

The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of

16

defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes ray opinion in that

17

one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time

18

engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent.

19

are mutually exclusive actions and terms.

20

They

The apparent reliance that Mr. Coke wishes the

21

court to accept regarding the activities of Messrs. Brgoch

22

and Isaacs, I do not have to reach the point that they are

23

sophisticated and/or somehow registered investors by the

24

fact they have had a long track record with Mr. Harry.

25

They did, in fact, move from different brokerage firms

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

4

1

Mr. Harry was employed with.

2

opinion, was on Mr. Harry and just incidentally with the

3

firm that he was employed by*

4

Their reliance, in my

I think that in this situation, Private Ledger

5

has done anything and everything they could to ensure

6

their registered agents are actually agents of them in

7

doing what their policies indicate that they are allowed

8

to do, i.e. trade in approved securities, have commissions

9

paid pursuant to that, have knowledge of the operations

10

that the agents are doing in relations to the brokerage

11

house and the investors, and indicating which ones and

12

gaining thorough knowledge of activity, then, somehow

13

ratifying the agent's position in this matter.

14

that has not been done so as a matter of law, I am ruling

15

for defendant, Private Ledger, regarding their motion for

16

summary judgment as to the statute of limitations.

17

remains to me to be a question of fact to be ferreted out

18

if, any there be, at trial.

I find

It

19

MR. KIRBY:

Thank you, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

With that, Mr. Kirby, Mr. Morgan,

21

please prepare the appropriate orders in this matter and

22

submit it to Mr. Coke for his approval prior to submission

23

to the court for signature.

24

MR. MORGAN:

25

MR. KIRBY:

I will do that, your Honor.
Thank you.
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1

(REPORTER'S NOTE:

Further pretrial

2

proceedings were had, being reported but not herein

3

transcribed.)

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3
4
5

STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS.

County of Salt Lake )
I, Nora S. Worthenf do certify that I am a

6

Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter

7

for the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah; that

8

as such reporter, I transcribed the proceedings of BRGOCH

9

AND ISAACS VS. HARRY, ET. AL., CASE NO.

920901463 CV at

10

the aforesaid time and place.

11

were reported by me in stenotype using computer-aided,

12

transcription, consisting of pages 3 through 6 inclusive.

13

That the same constitutes a true and correct transcription

14

of said proceedings;

15

That the trial proceedings

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with

16

any of the parties herein or thedLr counsel, and that I am

17

not interested in the events thereof.

18
19

WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
25th day of May, 1994.

20
21

23
24
25

<K&<*~> S

//J^^>

Not-a S. Worthen, RPR
Utah License No. 22-106373-7801
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Statutes

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 45
Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court of
Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment,
an order, and a decree

(herein referred to as "decisions") of the

Court of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46
Considerations governing review of certiorari,
(a)

Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of

right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons.

The following, while neither

controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered

a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a

question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(3)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered

a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or

(4)

When the Court of Appeals has decided an important

question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
(b)

After a Petition for Certiorari has been filed, the

panel that issued the opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a
minute entry recommending that the Supreme Court grant the
petition.

Parties shall not request such a recommendation by

motion or otherwise.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56(e)
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that: there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.

